In a decisive move prioritizing child welfare, Virginia Governor Glenn Youngkin vetoed House Bill 2613, a measure that sought to prevent courts and child welfare agencies from considering a parent's legal use of authorized substances—such as prescribed medications or cannabis—in custody or visitation determinations. The governor's action underscores a commitment to ensuring that children's safety remains paramount in family law proceedings.
Understanding HB2613
HB2613, introduced by Delegate Nadarius Clark (D-Suffolk), aimed to prohibit the consideration of a parent's lawful consumption of substances like medical marijuana or prescribed medications in child custody and visitation cases. The bill also directed the Board of Social Services to amend its regulations to align with this provision.
Governor Youngkin's Rationale
In his veto statement, Governor Youngkin expressed concerns that the bill could inadvertently expose children to harm. He highlighted the potential risks associated with legal substance use, particularly the increased incidents of children ingesting cannabis-infused products. The governor emphasized that, while the substances in question may be legally authorized for adult use, their presence in environments accessible to children could pose significant safety hazards.
Balancing Parental Rights and Child Safety
While the rights of parents to make lawful personal choices are respected, the overriding concern in custody and visitation matters must be the well-being of the child. Governor Youngkin's veto reflects a cautious approach, ensuring that courts retain the discretion to consider all factors that may impact a child's safety and development. By rejecting HB2613, the governor affirms that the legal status of a substance does not negate its potential risks to children in custody arrangements.
Conclusion
Governor Youngkin's veto of HB2613 reinforces the principle that child safety should not be compromised by legislative measures that may inadvertently limit judicial oversight. In matters as sensitive as child custody and visitation, it is imperative that courts maintain the ability to assess all relevant factors, including the implications of a parent's substance use, to safeguard the best interests of the child.
Now, Youngkin needs to be introduced into the false allegations claims in domestic violence and child abuse matters. Over 75% of domestic violence allegations are false. 80% of all domestic violence allegations are brought with a divorce action. Over 80% of domestic violence allegations are based on the amorphous, vague harassment statute. More than 50% of domestic violence allegations are filed in a serial manner in divorce cases. Yet, nothing happens to the false accuser. The victim of the false allegations is subjected to financial, emotional and physical ruin. If domestic violence allegations come with the proviso that anyone making false allegations of domestic violence can be subjected to perjury, false swearing on official court documents, and be subjected to 5-7 years in jail, $50,000 fine and loss of child custody and 10 years probation or community service.
Other states are starting to see that harassment couched in domestic violence terms are violative of First Amendment Freedom of Speech Rights. New Jersey's Supreme Court has ruled in State v. Burkert, 231 N.J. 257 (2017) that New Jersey statute N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a), only encompasses modes of communicative harassment that are (1) “invasive of the recipient’s privacy” or (2) “constitutes threats to safety”. State v. Burkert, 231 N.J. 257, 281 (2017).
Given that the communications between Plaintiff and Defendant are solely about the children, custody/parenting time, and the children’s school activities and grades, Defendant Mother has abused the domestic violence laws in a strategy and tactics to interfere with Plaintiff’s parental rights through an ongoing campaign of false allegations to perpetrate parental alienation. Since Defendant willfully refuses to cooperate with Plaintiff Father, it causes Plaintiff to become frustrated where he attempts to contact Defendant to allow him access to the children.
Plaintiff’s frustration can lead to harsh and crude terms, as happened in this instant case. A parent has the right to be frustrated with another parent when their parenting time/custody is being obstructed or interfered with. Defendant uses this frustration to create false allegations of domestic violence at any chance she can get. It is not an invasion of privacy as Defendant would like the Court to believe. She is the antagonist.
There is no categorical ‘harassment exception’ to the First Amendment’s free speech clause. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 2001)(Alito, J.). Speech “cannot be transformed into criminal conduct merely because it annoys, disturbs, or arouses contempt.” State v. Burkert, 231 N.J. 257, 281 (2017).
Even Plaintiff’s alleged harassing written communications, in the forms of texts or e-mails, “fall within the category of protected speech”. Virgin Islands v. Vanterpool, 767 F.3d 157, 160, 167 (3d Cir. 2014). Criminal harassment conviction was overturned because “expressions remain protected even where content hurts feelings, causes offense, or evokes resentment”. State v. Burkert, 444 N.J. Super. 591, 601 (App. Div. 2016), aff’d 231 N.J. 257 (2017).